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Abstract
Using the xed e¤ects estimator and the dynamic panel data system-GMM estima-
tor, on a sample of 75 banks, covering the period 1988-2005, this paper estimates how
wages in the Portuguese banking sector depend on the employers ability to pay. The
results indicate that wages are strongly positively correlated with prots even after
controlling for rm and workforce characteristics. The Lesters range of wages due to
rent-sharing is 46%  75% of the mean wage in the Portuguese banking sector.
Keywords: rent-sharing, Portuguese banking industry, dynamic panel data.
Jel classication: J31, J45, L33.
Corresponding author: Natália Pimenta Monteiro, Universidade do Minho, Departamento de Econo-
mia, Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal. Tel.: +351 253604539; fax: +351 253601380 E-mail:
N.Monteiro@eeg.uminho.pt.
yNIPE - Universidade do Minho
zNIPE - Universidade do Minho and IZA
1
1 Introduction
This paper tests whether wages in Portuguese banking depend on the employersability to
pay. Although a number of studies have examined how economy-wide wages are a¤ected
by rm or industry protability1, wage determination in a specic single industry has been
largely overlooked.2
The Portuguese banking sector provides an interesting case study for analysing rent-
sharing issues. In the eighties and early nineties, Portuguese banking experienced a success-
ful deregulatory reform (OECD, 1999) comprising not only the abolishment of price and
entry barriers but also a privatisation program which was accompanied by a simultaneous
rise in the wage premium and rm prots (Monteiro, 2007). In addition, despite the coor-
dinated bargaining mechanism prevailing in the industry where trade unions and a group
of banks meet each year to negotiate a single collective wage agreement3 there is evidence
of bargaining over wages at rm level. Indeed, the wage drift the di¤erential between the
wage dened by the collective agreement and the actual wage paid has increased since
early nineties (Aperta et al., 1994) and was the second highest in 1999 among 16 industries
in Portugal (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005).
To our knowledge, this study is the rst to provide evidence on rent-sharing allowing
for wage inertia, which is an important real-world phenomenon and using a system-GMM
estimator. We also make use of an unexplored and rich data at rm level collected by
Associação Portuguesa de Bancos (APB) which covers 18 years, from 1988 through 2005,
and o¤ers information about rm human capital characteristics.
2 Data, model specication and results
The dataset released every year by APB in the yearly Boletim Informativo consists of data
from company accounts of all banks in Portugal. Beyond standard nancial and operational
information, the dataset reports other rm characteristics such as ownership, size and age,
and portrays the workforce in terms of schooling, tenure, type of activity and occupation in
each bank. Summary statistics for the data are presented Table 1. The key variables, log
wages and prots per employee, are computed following the usual practice in the literature
1See, e.g., Arai (2003), Estevão and Tevlin (2003), Dobbelaere (2004) and Budd et al. (2005) and the
references therein.
2Black and Strahan (2001) is a notable exception.
3The only exception to this bargaining system are two banks, BCP and CGD, which have signed (indi-
vidual) rm wage agreements since 2001 and 2003, respectively.
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(Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). Thus, the log average wage is constructed as the logarithm
of the ratio between the reported wage bill and total employment. Prot per employee is
obtained by taking sales revenues less operational costs less reported wage bill and dividing
by total employment.4 The capital-labour ratio is obtained by dividing xed assets by total
employment. All monetary measures are expressed in current 103 Euros.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log average wage 731 3:586 :646 :822 5:514
Prots per worker 731 88:918 109:901  313:909 883:747
Ownership (%)
Public 731 :109 :312 0 1
Private domestic 731 :520 :500 0 1
Foreign 731 :371 :483 0 1
Firm size (103 employees) 731 1:410 2:258 :005 10:882
Firm age 731 27:435 41:575 0 161
Capital-labour ratio 731 73:444 71:751 0 676:675
Schooling (%)
Primary 571 :134 :164 0 :662
High school 571 :423 :174 0 :867
University degree 571 :443 :234 :039 1
Tenure, in years (%)
[0  6[ 728 :493 :309 0 1
[6  11[ 728 :196 :143 0 :800
[11  [ 728 :311 :288 0 1
Commercial activity (%) 730 :452 :249 0 1
Occupation
1 730 :236 :103 0 :868
2 730 :280 :177 0 :892
3 730 :446 193 0 :899
4 (lowest) 730 :038 :043 0 :508
Table 1 indicates that between 1988 and 2005, the Portuguese banking sector is mainly
composed by privately owned rms either domestic (52%) or foreign (37%) as public
owned banks represent a small share (11%) of the market. This ownership structure is
due to the abolishment of entry barriers in 1983=84 but also to an extensive privatisation
program, which took place between 1989 and 1997 and allowed 11 out of 12 public banks to
4More precisely, our prots measure corresponds to the item Resultado Bruto de Exploração in the income
sheet.
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become fully private. Nevertheless, publicly owned banks still employ approximately 40%
of the total banking workforce, as public banks are much larger (more then 3 times) than
the sector average. Firm age and capital-labour ratio also reect this dichotomy between
publicly and privately owned banks, as the former are, on average, older and less capital
intensive than their private counterparts (not shown in the table).
In terms of human capital attributes, banks employ, on average, a higher proportion
of graduated (university degree) and young employees (5 or less years of tenure). Again,
this is more pronounced for all privately owned rms, but in particular for foreign rms,
which have more than half of the total workforce in these two categories. Finally, banking
employees are working mainly in intermediate/middle occupations and in other activities
than the commercial one (public employees are the only exception).
For the empirical analysis, we specify two panel data models, one static and one dynamic:
wit = 1PWit + 2PWitFit + 3PWitPit + 4Zit + vi + "it; (1)
wit = 1wit 1 + 1PWit + 2PWitFit + 3PWitPit + 4Zit + vi + "it; (2)
where subscripts i and t index bank i and time t; w is average log wage, PW is prots per
worker; F and P are indicators for foreign and public banks respectively, Z is a set of other
regressors that vary by bank and time, v is an unobservable bank e¤ect and " is an error
term. In our specications, Z includes time-varying measures of rm size (thousands of
employees) and rm age, capital-labour ratio, four attributes of the workforce educational
attainments (three categories), seniority (three categories), type of activity (two categories)
and occupation (four categories) and time (year) e¤ects.
Table 2 reports empirical results for the wage equation (1). Column 1 shows xed esti-
mates for the whole sample when Z includes rm size, rm age, capital-labour ratio, bank
and time xed e¤ects. Column 2 adds eight variables regarding all workforce attributes
presented in Table 1 to previous specication. Column 3 uses the specication adopted in
column 1 but applied to the sample of column 2. All columns report the coe¢ cient es-
timates of the regressors and their respective standard errors (clustered to control for the
nonindependence of repeated observations of the same rm).
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Table 2: Rent-sharing results for static models
Variable S1 S2 S3
Prots-per-worker(PW) .001 .001 .0009
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
PW*Foreign .0005 .0008 .0008
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
PW*Public .006 .003 .003
(.005) (.003) (.003)
Public -.119 -.276 -.261
(.145) (.144) (.147)
Firm size(thousands) -.025 -.063 -.064
(.045) (.038) (.045)
Firm age .091 .054 .067
(.007) (.011) (.007)
Capital-per-worker .002 .001 .001
(.0007) (.0005) (.0006)
Obs 731 571 571
Banks 77 75 75
LogLikelihood -118.925 -81.605 -87.859
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank. The
dependent variable is log average wage. The regressions are esti-
mated by xed-e¤ects, and include time e¤ects.
Comparing the results from the three specications, we see that the estimates of 1 are
generally una¤ected by the inclusion of human regressors. However, as these regressors are
jointly signicant at 10% (the joint signicance test has an F-statistic of 1.80, with a p-value
of .091), our preferred specication is the most expanded one presented in column 2. Thus,
according to this specication, the estimated e¤ect of prots per employee on log wages is
.001, with a t-statistic of 2.52 and a p-value of .014. Despite small when compared to previous
studies (e.g., Arai, 2003, Dobbelaere, 2004 or Budd et al., 2005), it implies a notable wage-
prot elasticity of .094.5 This gure is below the elasticities found by Abowd and Lemieux
(1993), Van Reen (1996) and Estevão and Tevlin (2003), between :20 and :29, but above
the range of elasticities usually found in the literature of domestic rent-sharing, between
5We also test if wages are sensitive to both increases and decreases in rents. Estimates using the spec-
ication presented in column 2, splitting the sample according to whether the change in prot per worker
is positive or negative, suggest that this is not the case. The coe¢ cient is nearly identical in both cases,
although less precisely estimated.
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:006 and :05 (Budd et al., 2005). This result is thus consistent with previous evidence of
rm-level bargaining. However, this elasticity is much higher than the one found by Arai
(2003), who study rent-sharing under similar labour market features in Sweden.6 Moreover,
in accordance with the wage-setting system in the sector, but in contrast to earlier ndings
that show that public and foreign rms tend to appropriate higher proportions of rents, the
degree of rent-sharing is independent of bank ownership. Only public banks present a sizable,
but insignicant, positive di¤erence in rent-sharing. Public banks also pay substantially less
(24 per cent: e :276 1 = :241) than their private counterparts when workforce characteristics
are controlled for.
The bank size e¤ect is surprisingly negative in all specications, being only marginally
signicant (p-value of :098) in our preferred model.7 Firm age has a notable and signicant
e¤ect on log wages of :054; implying that more visiblebanks pay higher wages. Capital
per worker also has a positive e¤ect of .001 (p-value =:037), similar in magnitude to that
reported in Sweden or USA (Arai, 2003).
To allow for wage inertia and to investigate whether potential simultaneity of wages and
prots, and measurement error, a¤ect the results, we also estimate a dynamic version of
wage equation (1). Table 3 repeats variable specication of Table 2 for the dynamic wage
equation (2).
Given the presence of bank-specic e¤ects, the estimation of equation (2) by OLS, xed
or random e¤ects, is inconsistent since, by denition, wit 1 is correlated with vi. One possible
solution is to take rst di¤erences to eliminate bank-xed e¤ect and apply the Arellano and
Bond (1991) rst-di¤erenced generalized method of moments (GMM). This method allows
us to control for the bias introduced by omitted time-invariant variables. However, if the
lagged levels of the series are only weakly correlated with subsequent rst-di¤erences, so
that the instruments available for the rst-di¤erenced equations are weak (Bond et al.,
2001, p.6), this solution has poor nite sample properties on bias and precision. Another
possibility, which we follow in this study, consists of estimating the system-GMM presented
by Blundell and Bond (1998). This system combines a set of moment conditions for the rst-
di¤erenced equations with a set of moment conditions implied for level equations. Relative
to the original GMM, the estimation of the system-GMM is preferable when the dependent
6Arai (2003) nds that the degree of rent-sharing in Sweden is similar to the USA, despite the di¤erences
between the two countries in terms of wage dispersion and wage-setting institutions.
7When we interact size with two ownership variables, none of the three variables appear to be statistically
signicant.
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and/or independent variables are persistent.
Following Bowsher (2003), the choice of our instruments is parsimonious. We use wit 2 as
instruments for the rst-di¤erenced equation and wit 1 as instruments for the equations in
level. The explanatory variables, PWit, PWitFit and PWitPit are treated as endogenous. In
the estimation, we use two to three lags of their levels as instruments for the rst-di¤erenced
equations and lagged rst-di¤erences as instruments for the level equations. The remaining
explanatory variables are treated as predetermined. Therefore, we use in the rst-di¤erenced
equations their levels lagged one to three periods and contemporaneous rst-di¤erences as
instruments for the equations in levels. We also report results for the two-step GMM esti-
mation procedure, following the correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
In Table 3, the Sargan and the Di¤erence Sargan overindentication tests do not reject the
validity of instruments used in each regression. In particular, Di¤erence Sargan tests indicate
the validity of the extra instruments used in the system-GMM estimation when compared
to the original Arellano and Bond (1991) proposal. The serial correlation tests based on the
rst-di¤erenced residuals fail to reject the hypothesis of no second-order correlation. These
results, read in conjunction with (the statistically signicant) high persistence in wages
(always above :66), indicate that the system-GMM procedure is appropriate to estimate our
dynamic panel model.
Table 3: Rent-sharing results for dynamic models
Variable D1 D2 D3
LagWage .672 .663 .741
(.089) (.108) (.066)
Prots-per-worker(PW) .002 .002 .002
(.001) (.0008) (.001)
PW*Foreign -.002 -.001 -.002
(.001) (.001) (.001)
PW*Public .004 .0008 .005
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Public -.215 .149 -.181
(.117) (.197) (.177)
Foreign .433 .204 .336
(.225) (.222) (.333)
Firm size(thousands) -.084 -.012 -.114
(.059) (.075) (.057)
Continues on next page...
7
... table 3 continued
Variable D1 D2 D3
Firm age .004 .0002 .005
(.002) (.002) (.003)
Capital-per-worker .001 .001 .002
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
Obs 652 527 527
Banks 77 75 75
Sargan 53.805 45.947 47.564
Sargan-DF 47 48 40
Sargan-pv .230 .557 .192
Di¤S-AB 27.547 29.068 21.691
Di¤SAB-pv .233 .409 .300
AR1 -3.144 -3.043 -3.157
AR1-pv .002 .002 .002
AR2 -.868 .020 -.377
AR2-pv .385 .984 .706
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is log average wage. The regressions are estimated by the sys-
tem GMM procedure as discussed in Blundell and Bond (1998),
and include time e¤ects. The estimation details, including the
instrumens used, are described in Section 2. Sargan is the test for
overidentifying restrictions. Di¤S-AB is the di¤erence in the Sar-
gan test between the system and the estimation in rst-di¤erences;
df stands for degrees of freedom and pv stands for p-value of the
test. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for rst- and second-order serial
correlation in rst-di¤erenced residuals.
Table 3 provides further support for the existence of strong rent-sharing in the Portuguese
banking sector. In all three specications, the e¤ect of prots per employee on log wages
is equal to :002 (twice larger than before) and statistically signicant at the 10% level.
The implied prot-per-employee wage elasticities are thus considerably larger than the ones
found previously with xed e¤ects. Considering the most expanded specication presented in
column 2, the GMM estimate indicates that a 1% increase in the banksprotability increases
wages by :15%: Taken together, the prot-per-employee wage elasticities established in both
(static and dynamic) models, imply an impact on wages due to a movement from the bottom
to the top of prots distribution, between 46% and 75%: These Lesters (1952) range of
wages are therefore well above the 16% and 24% established for the UK (Hildreth and
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Oswald,1997) and the USA (Blanchower et al., 1996) or the 12%  24% found in Sweden,
where the wage setting mechanisms are similar to our case.
The remaining results in Table 3 are in line with the overall ndings obtained earlier with
the static model. The major di¤erence is that the inclusion of the lagged explained variable
tends to reduce the magnitude of the estimated e¤ects of the other variables. The standard
errors are also larger, which makes the estimates not statistically signicant. Therefore,
di¤erences in rent-sharing among the three rmsownership are again not signicant, the
bank size and rm age e¤ects are considerably smaller and not signicant. The impact of
the capital-ratio has an equal magnitude and sign but is not signicant. Di¤erences in pay
level among rms ownership, although sizable, are again not statistically signicant.
3 Conclusions
This paper measures the degree of rent-sharing degree in the Portuguese banking indus-
try in the period 1988-2005. Using the xed-e¤ects estimator and the system-GMM on a
sample of 75 banks, we nd an elasticity of wage with respect to prots-per-employee that
varies between :094 and :154, well above the usual benchmarks found previously. Our re-
sults, in contrast to Arai (2003), may imply that wage-setting institutions do matter for the
magnitude of rent-sharing.
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